Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan *

Raoul Motika 1
The "Search for Identity" is a common feature of ex-Socialist societies in transition. Like in other republics of the former Soviet Union the dissolution of the communist system left the Azerbaijani society in an unexpected economic and sometimes humanitarian catastrophe. At the same time, the need for a reassessment of the country's past and present emerged in society. It goes without saying that religion, i.e. Islam, could and, according to many local intellectuals, should play an important role in the formation of the Azerbaijani nation. 1 Moreover, many common people showed an increasing interest in their formerly condemned Islamic roots and turned towards religion, some even by joining religious networks, in order to find spiritual as well as material relief to get through the hard times 2 .
2
The framework in which I would like to present some aspects of Islam in present-day Southern Caucasia is mainly defined by the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In contrast to the opinion that Islam displays a more or less uniform character in all former Muslim Soviet republics, it is true to say that in these countries Islam was basically shaped by the specific circumstances of each republic, rather than by international Islamic movements and trends. This is particularly true in the case of Azerbaijan.
3
We may assume that at present about 93% out of more than 7.5 million Azerbaijanis have a Muslim background and from this majority 65% to 75% are connected with Shi'ite traditions 3 .
4
Azeri Turks form by far the largest Muslim ethnic group in Azerbaijan and belong mostly to the Twelver Shi'ite branch of Islam (about 75%) to 92% do consider themselves as Muslims, but comply with only a (quite often little) part of the religious regulations. Only about 3% call themselves atheists 6 . In general, the degree of religiosity is higher in some Shi'ite regions, i.e. in Southern Azerbaijan and on the Apsheron Peninsula (Baku and its outskirts) than in those areas inhabited by Sunnites; it is also higher in towns than in the countryside. Islamic marriage and funeral rites are widely followed whereas active participation in Muharram mourning is not that common despite a quite impressive number of visitors to the mosques during religious festivals.
6
Whereas in 1976 there were 16 registered mosques and one mädräsä (Islamic school) in Azerbaijan, there were at the end of the Soviet period already about 200 mosques 7 , and until today this figure has increased explosively to more than 1,300 mosques 8 , innumerable Islamic schools, a working Islamic university, another, financed by the Saudis, in preparation and a Turkish sponsored İlâhiyat Fakü-Itesi.The phenomenon of a "religious renaissance", taking place in parallel with a "national rebirth" or "birth", is a fact which cannot be ignored.
7
Of special interest is the fact that Shi'ism as well as the common Azeri-Turkish ethnolinguistic background relates the Azerbaijani Azeri Turks closely to their brethren in Iran. The close relationship between both Azeri populations is not only based on their common language and a common Shi'ite background, but also built on a culture influenced by centuries of Iranian cultural dominance.
8
However, since Iran's loss of hegemony over the khanates north of the Aras river due to the advance of Czarist Russia at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Azeris of that region have gradually developed several features differentiating them from the Azeri population of Iran. While a secularisation and Turkifization process gained momentum in Russian Azerbaijan, Shi'ite Islam remained the dominating superstructure, along with an intensification of Irano-Persian cultural influence in Iranian Azerbaijan. A crucial period in this respect was the time of the Stalinist and the Pahlavi regimes, which isolated the two Azerbaijans from each other quite effectively 9 . The decisive historical event which fundamentally changed the relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan was the tearing down of the "Iron Curtain" in the winter of 1990 when the border fortifications were pulled down by the people of Nakhichevan.
9
The pre-Soviet and Soviet processes of secularisation in Azerbaijan led to the general acceptance of a secular political and juridical system as well as a lay system of education. So, Islamic identity is a part of, or even subordinate to a mainly non-religious selfdefinition which is not only the product of Soviet nationality policy, but has much deeper roots. Secularisation and modernisation in Azerbaijan have their origins in the second half of the XIX th century, when Caucasian Muslims confronted with Czarist colonialism and growing Armenian nationalism started to re-define themselves and began to fight for a better position for their community. The slogan "Turkism, Modernisation and Islam" originating from Musavat, the leading party of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan (1918) (1919) (1920) stands for its own. Today, the debate about the exact meaning of "Turkism", which some see as a Pan-Turkish ideology opposed to "Azerbaijanism" and others interpret as Azerbaijani nationalism only imbedded into a greater Turkic cultural context, still continues. Obviously, Islam plays a crucial role in that vision, but only in third place. majority of the population. On the other hand, one should not ignore the fact that Islamic traditions and beliefs are often an integral part of everyday life, but are primarily seen as national, not religious traditions. During the Soviet period religious praxis largely became individualised, e.g. the belief in magical practices became a widespread phenomenon and pilgrimages to the numerous holy shrines were and still are very popular 10 . This development is directly connected to the destruction of the clerical structures during the atheist campaigns of the twenties and the brutal Stalinist purges of the thirties. Since 1928 Soviet Azerbaijanis have also been isolated from the Shi'ite centres of religious learning in Iran and Iraq. As a consequence, in the middle of the 1980s the number of official mullahs throughout Azerbaijan was estimated at 50-70 men 11 . Those had a comparatively low level of theological expertise caused by the restrictions on the Islamic institutions of learning in the Soviet Union. Therefore, Shi'ite Azerbaijan could not develop a religious hierarchy comparable to Iran or Iraq with Ayatollahs or even a marjaci taqlīd ('source for emulation') at the top, a fact which in future will automatically lead to a growing orientation towards Qom, Najaf and other places of Shi'ite higher learning. . In autumn 1997 the government demanded reregistration of all religious communities requiring the approval by "traditional religious organisations". This was extremely difficult for certain groups 15 . For this restrictive policy the Russian and Armenian religious laws may have served as a model. According to these laws so-called "non-historical religious communities" have no chance for official registration. Theoretically, for all Islamic organisations asking for registration approval by the semi-official "Administration of the Caucasian Muslims" (Qafqazya Müsülmanlar İdaräsi; hereafter: QMİ) is mandatory. For obvious reasons the QMİ strongly opposes all religious groups which want to stay independent and might emerge as its rivals. As long as these unregistered groups keep a low profile the state apparatus, however, does not show the slightest interest in actively impeding them 16 .
14 Parallel to the leaders of other CIS-republics the Azerbaijani state leadership tries to use religion to strengthen its legitimacy. This is e.g. demonstrated by President Äliyev's widely celebrated hajj, Koran recitations during political festivities and the incorporation of religious holidays into the official calendar
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. Besides some tiny successor organisations to the Communist Party, all other political parties, pro-government and opposition alike, pay lip service to Islam in one form or another, claiming that religion is part of their national identity as Muslim Azerbaijani Turks. Main components of this identity are the Azeri-Turkish language and the idea of a common history as well as a set of cultural norms stemming from the Islamic background. Thus, Islam is tightly bound up with the idea of an Azerbaijani nation which is part of the Turkic and Islamic world. Hence, it is not astonishing that the fact of nominally being Muslim served as a marker of difference to distinguish themselves from the nominally Christian Armenians during the bloody conflict about Nagorno Karabagh (the same is true for the constructed Armenian identity). This assumption, however, should not lead us to interpret a mainly territorial conflict as a religious one.
guardians of religious tradition. In pre-Soviet times women traditionally expressed their religiousness mostly in private which after the Bolshevikis' takeover of the country helped them to escape persecution. As a result women more than men became safeguardians and conveyers of religious knowledge (often in a rudimentary form). Therefore holy places are mainly visited by women and some women even function as "female mullahs", a few even did before in Soviet times 18 . 18 The QMİ is, in theory, controlled by a regionally elected body of 25 Qazis, the so-called Qazilär Şurasi. There have been no elections held for years now and even the Şeyhülislam and the whole governing body of the administration should have been the subject of an election for several years now. That these elections have been postponed year after year indicates the complicated situation the official hierarchy is facing due to its bad image as an organisation, controlled by the KGB during the Soviet years, about which also rumours of corruption are going around. By many believers the Şeyhülislamis regarded as an opportunist because he welcomed every single political change during the last 15 years with the same degree of enthusiasm. When President Äliyev tries to show his respect to religion, he is using the leadership of the QMİ by calling them to deliver some prayers before his speeches on the occasion of a religious holiday. But, this attitude of the QMİ leadership could also be interpreted as neutral behaviour towards the political power and acceptance of the supremacy of politics over the clerical structures, thus reflecting the framework set by the constitution.
19 At present the QMİ seeks to extend its influence and to broaden its material basis. In 1999 there were some 1,300 Mosques in Azerbaijan of which about 1000 were under direct supervision of the QMİ
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. This process was backed by the state and positively influenced by the possibility of channelling foreign financial and material aid through the Institution's networks. But, in practice the mosques have to finance themselves; thus, most of the income of the local mosques still stems from fees rendered to them by the population for marriage and funeral services 20 . In this context it is understandable that foreign mullahs and imams are unwelcome competitors for the scarce resources. In this struggle an important tool of control is the question of official registration of religious organisations by the state. In this matter the QMİ was able to get the right of veto from the state, at least with regard to Islamic institutions. A step which greatly enhanced its position. The situation is being complicated by the fact that a former deputy of the . Except for thefiqh-classes there exist no different curricula for Shi'a and Sunni students. As explained by an official of the University, the high tuition fees are, despite the economic misery and the low wages of the students' parents, no obstacle because of the good prospects for the graduates to get a post at a mosque. Since the appointment to a mosque or the taking over of a mosque from somebody else opens considerable possibilities for revenues gained by collecting the fees for marriage contracts as well as for funeral services, the competition in this field may be strong in the future.
21 In regard to the religious ideology, the Board and the official Islamic University are trying to develop a national Azerbaijani brand of Islam by diminishing Shi'a-Sunni differences and fighting against foreign missionaries under the pretext of keeping the so-called unique peaceful coexistence of both branches of Islam. Azerbaijan may be the sole Islamic country where adherents of both sects pray together in the same mosque
21
, sometimes even led by the same mullah performing both prayer rites.
Representatives of this institution take part in the country's Älmi İslam Şurasi('Scientific
Islamic Council') comprising of academics as well as of religious functionaries. Some members of this body of about 23 members, which is seeking to develop a national religious policy, publish commentaries and interpretations of important questions like the compulsory nature of the Islamic law and the status of women. Some of these interpretations are innovative and reform-minded.
23 When it comes to politics, the leaders of the QMİ pay their lip-service to the principle of a secular state, but demand at the same time the adoption of Islam as state religion, the integration of Islamic law into the legal system and try to widen the influence of Islam in the public sphere.
24 The most important competitor for funds is the second layer of Azerbaijani Islam -Popular Religiosity. A spectacular example for this is the Ziyarätgah of Ät Aqa in Şövälan on the fringes of Baku. In 1992 a certain Hacı Nizam occupied the place to put everything in a proper order as he proclaimed. The shrine earns millions of Manats (the Azerbaijani currency) through a steady stream of pilgrims to the place. So, Hacı Nizam could afford to build really impressive buildings and feeds hundreds of poor people every day, a fact which secures him a large following. Up to now he could defend his position against the claims of the QMİ. This can mean that he has some protection by the ruling elite -perhaps because he shares the income of the shrine with them as some people spread around. It is 26 My impression is that these kind of shrines represent the most popular form of Islam in Azerbaijan helping the people very much to bear the hardships of a society in transition.
And if a religious entrepreneur organises the shrine properly this, in the eyes of the visitors, is also a proof of the "saint's" spiritual power. Visiting shrines is also a form of expressing religious feelings without getting into conflict with the secular society and the state.
27 Many representatives of the third layer of Azeri Islam -the self-declared mullahs or religious leaders -are very much opposed to shrines and to popular religion connected to so-called non-Islamic behaviour. Some of them, like Sheykh Äläskär from Ämircan whom I am going to present here, are physically harassed by followers of the QMİ or Shi'ite Islamist groups. They themselves are strong enemies of the veneration of shrines and even of the setting up of graveyards. Besides the religious arguments that there must not exist a mediator between men and God and that nobody besides God is allowed to be worshipped, Sheykh Äläskär denounces the official mullahs as well as the shrine guardians as being nothing else than pure materialists. They in return use the invective "Vahabi" to denounce their rivals. Sheykh Äläskär with his alleged 500 followers is a typical convert who found his way to Islam at the age of about forty, learned Arabic by self-study andrejects everything besides the Koran as being a legitimate source for Islamic beliefs. Besides his charismatic personality and the spiritual needs of the people, an important cause for his large number of followers seems to be the solidarity ties in his community, based on the principle of zakat. He could manage to take over and restore a historical mosque used as storage during the Soviet period which his community defends against attacks by the local Shi'ite Mosque mullah's followers. An important feature is that he denounces the differences between Sunni and Shi'a Islam which he sees as a forbidden innovation to Islam (bidca). Sheykh Äläskär says that he does not have any problem with the state. Besides passivity on the side of the state apparatus this may be due to the fact that he objects to the Islamic Party with the argument that it is engaged in politics under the guise of religion 25 .
28 When religio-political activities of pro-Iranian tendency in Azerbaijan are discussed, the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan 26 as the most well known and largest group in this respect has to be presented. The Party -as fourth layer of Azerbaijani Islam -officially registered in 1992, experienced a major blow in May 1996 when its leadership was arrested under the accusation of spying for Iran and sending youngsters to the Islamic Republic for military training. It is true that the ideological outlook of this party, whose membership figures range between 20 000 and 70 000, is very much under Iranian influence and that it is the sole relevant Azerbaijani party propagating a close relationship with Iran. One of the main problems of the Party is that it lacks -despite the large number of partly young followers -substantial support from intellectuals and the middle strata of the Azerbaijani society. An interesting fact is that the Party has a separate structure for women. Perhaps due to the harsh persecution by the state which lead to the death of some of the accused leaders or because of a change in Iranian policy, the currently leading fraction of the Party tries to show a more moderate face. Instead of propagating an Islamic state they have entered into a dialogue with other opposition parties to discuss co-operation. Regarding the differences between Shi'ite and Sunnite Islam, one of the Party's leaders stated in an interview that they are a product of Jewish conspiracy. The main advantage of the Party has always been that a lot of religious people in Azerbaijan understood the Islamic Party not as a political party but as the representative of Islam in the public sphere. However, this image has widely dwindled. . They came, of course, to an agreement with the Azerbaijani state. Turkish religious influence can be seen also in northern and western Azerbaijan where Turkish organisations built mosques and provided religious personnel for a certain period. As reported by an Azerbaijani newspaper, in the early nineties, the Turkish Refah Partisi allegedly received 500 000 US$ from Saudi Arabia to finance their activities in Azerbaijan. This information seems to point to a close co-operation of different religio-political Sunni organisations, with the objective of gaining influence in the successoring states of the former Soviet Union
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. 36 To put it briefly, in the beginning official and semi-official Turkish structures seemed to make the race. But, during the second half of the 1990s the Turkish position became weaker. This happened due to the fact that the local believers gradually noticed that many of the hocas coming from Turkey were propagating Sunni interpretations of Islam which were in contradiction to their Shi'ite traditions. Some of them openly criticised Shi'ite popular practices, such as the şaxsey-vaxsey(the mourning about the death of Imam Hüseyin in Kerbala) 35 , which has the potential to build up an antagonist atmosphere between the adherents of both branches of Islam. Besides, the above mentioned competition for the scarce resources mainly coming from marriage and funeral fees, inevitably brought the Turks in conflict with local religious structures. At present, however, at least eight 'Turkish' mosques exist in Azerbaijan. Owing to the fact that there are no Iranian mosques, we may conclude that Iran's religious position even in Shi'ite Azerbaijan is quite weak. with Azerbaijani partners may be a more efficient tool to gain religio-political influence than full-time missionary activities (37).
38 As presented above, Islam in Azerbaijan is a multifaceted phenomenon which can be understood only in the context of a society in transition. One of its most important features is the relationship between Shi'ite and Sunnite Islam which is still dominated by an ecumenical and sometimes eclectic spirit, while being increasingly beleaguered by foreign missionaries on the one hand and put under pressure by the dynamic development of Azerbaijani society on the other hand. In conclusion it should be emphasized that nowadays Islam plays only a very limited role in the political sphere and that only a small part of the population supports the idea of establishing an 'Islamic order'. This is due to the long tradition of secularism in Azerbaijan and to the fact that the strong nationalistic movement is secular in character and sometimes even fights together with the ruling elite against their rival -political Islam. Yet, on the longer run, if the political elite of Azerbaijan does not succeed in improving the disastrous conditions of life of the vast majority of the people, the population may express its discontent through a politicized form of Islam. El Islam en Azerbaijan representa un fenómeno complejo que solo puede ser comprendido en el contexto de una sociedad en transición. Uno de los fenómenos más importantes del Islam en Azerbaijan es el de las relaciones entre el Islam sunnita y el Islam chiíta, entre los que aún prevalece un espíritu ecuménico, y a veces aún ecléctico. La situación es tanto más grave en tanto hay misioneros extranjeros por un lado, y la presión de una sociedad en transición dinámica por el otro. Hoy, el Islam juega un rol poco importante en el ámbito politico, y la mayor parte de la población de Azerbaijan no es partidaria del establecimiento de un « orden islámico ». Esto se debe a una larga tradición de secularización en Azerbaijan, y al hecho de que incluso el potente movimiento nacionalista está secularizado, y lucha codo a codo con la elite gubernamental contra el rival común, el Islam politico. Pero a largo plazo, y sobre todo si la elite política no llega a elevar el nivel de vida de la gran mayoría de la población, lamentable en el momento actual, esta podría expresar su descontento bajo la forma de un integrismo islámico.
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